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!e paper describes the design methodology of a military messaging system. !e system’s design is 
characterized by its coherence among security, transmission medium, and design protocol, which allow 
added value in the strategic operations center. !e system allows using a selected data base for subsequent 
applications of operations research tools and simulation. !e system was designed with a low bandwidth 
communications network (HF / VHF / UHF and satellite phone calls) as the transmission media. !e 
messaging system security is based on a public key cryptographic system. !e paper also shows some of 
the test results of the system’s functionality.
El documento describe la metodología de diseño de un sistema de mensajería militar. El diseño del sistema 
está caracterizado por su coherencia entre la seguridad, el medio de transmisión y el protocolo de diseño, 
lo que permite obtener valor agregado en el centro estratégico de operaciones. El sistema permite utilizar 
una base de información seleccionada, para posteriormente aplicarle herramientas de investigación de 
operaciones y simulación. El sistema fue diseñado tomando una red de comunicaciones de bajo ancho 
de banda (HF/VHF/UHF y telefonía satelital), como medio de transmisión. La seguridad del sistema 
de mensajería está basada en un sistema criptográ"co de clave pública. El documento muestra además, 
algunos de los resultados obtenidos en las pruebas de funcionalidad del sistema.
Key words: Military Messaging System, strategic Messaging System, Messaging System design, design 
methodology, communications network.
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Among the projects executed by the R&D plus 
innovation direction at COTECMAR, prototype 
was developed of a Messaging system for the 
exchange of short information and with non-
synchronic character between tactical units in the 
"eld of operations and the strategic Command and 
Control Center. 
!e Messaging system is a comprehensive part of 
a set of sub-systems that make up the Command 
and Control Main System, and it is supported by 
di#erent technologies and existing communication 
infrastructures to carry out its purposes. 
!e objective of this document is to describe the 
design methodology of the Messaging System 
developed by clearly showing the advantages 
obtained by making a coherent design of all the 
components of said system, which was elaborated 
by bearing in mind the requirements from 
Command and Control and the restrictions in the 
means available, seeking to satisfy and provide the 
necessary connectivity (via di#erent transmission 
media), interoperability, and security in the 
transportation of information.
!e need for a reliable communications system is 
ever-more important in military operations, given 
that the potential e#ectiveness of combat systems 
supporting the mission depends to a greater extent 
on adequate coordination. Also, implementing 
the concepts posed by the Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW) according to which the complete 
availability of information at the indicated time 
and place is the most relevant factor, relying fully 
on a communications infrastructure with su$cient 
capacities for transportation of information 
(Snyder, 1993).
Although telecommunications are frequently 
characterized through attributes like bandwidth, 
data transference rate, or error rate, its main 
value within the Command and Control context 
is derived from the possibility of establishing 
connectivity not merely among the commanders 
involved in the mission, but also among the 
di#erent participants who are under their charge 
and the network of sensors or devices supporting 
the acquisition of relevant information for the 
purposes of the operation. Additionally, the 
exchange of information on a safe communications 
infrastructure is an indispensable requirement 
in the military setting, to the point that the 
interception of communication can mean the 
di#erence between victory and defeat (Hutcherson, 
1994).
A messaging system is a form of text-based 
communication, in real or di#ered time, between 
two or more individuals (units or entities). !e text 
is sent through devices connected to a network.
Currently, it is common to "nd messaging systems 
on the internet, o#ering easily accessed speci"c 
services, most of which are based on TCP/IP.
For the speci"c military case, messaging is the main 
path of data communication between Command 
and Control center and the operational tactical 
units.
“!e implementation of communication networks 
in military settings confronts important challenges 
that must be considered before reaching a practical 
application. In the "rst place, diverse types of 
airborne units exist, like airplanes and helicopters, 
which are in the combat space, implying di#erent 
degrees of mobility that must be managed. 
Meanwhile, land or naval units face variable 
environmental settings that a#ect in di#erent ways 
the propagation of radio-frequency signals. !ese 
conditions faced by the tactical units translate into 
limited bandwidths, intermittent connections, 
and a high probability of delay in information 
transmissions, situations that must be considered 
when implementing a data communications 
system” (Michael J. Ryan, 2002). 
A messaging system seeking to satisfy military 
needs must comply with the following general 
requirements:
t Privacy.
t Authenticity.
,QWURGXFWLRQ
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t Certi"cation.
t Integrity.
t Non-repudiation.
t Availability
!e communications system developed is 
able to facilitate interconnection through the 
communication networks that are currently 
part of the existing technological infrastructure, 
adequately integrate their functionality, and satisfy 
the requirements of the joint operations undertaken. 
Additionally, the communications system permits 
data exchange via di#erent transmission media and 
among equipment from di#erent manufacturers, 
guaranteeing the system’s interoperability. 
In general, the design of the components of the 
messaging system was carried out in parallel 
manner. However, each component was developed 
by following a particular methodology.
To develop the architecture for the information 
system, an incremental debugging scheme was 
used based on the architecture centered design 
method (ACDM), developed by Anthony Lattanze 
at Carnegie Mellon University, and architecture 
points of view were those elaborated by Nick 
Rozanski and Eoin Woods.  
For the communications design protocol, we 
kept in mind criteria like: security, bandwidth 
restrictions and data optimization (selection of 
particular data of the operation under execution), 
which would permit assigning greater added value 
to the Command and Control system. Likewise, 
we considered the design of the architecture of the 
Command and Control system for information 
access, bearing in mind security mechanisms. !e 
design protocol was based on the methodology 
described in the book "Design and Validation of 
Computer Protocols" (Gerard J.Holzmann, 1991).
Software design was carried out by using the 
Rational Uni"ed Process (RUP) methodology, 
which is a software development process and 
along with the Uni"ed Modeling Language 
(UML) constitutes the standard methodology 
most often used for analysis, implementation, 
and documentation of systems aimed at objects. 
!e messaging system developed comprises six 
di#erent applications that interoperate bearing in 
mind the protocol and security criteria, bandwidth 
restrictions, and data optimization previously 
proposed. Four of these applications were 
developed in Visual C++ language and two others 
in Visual C#.
!e methodology employed in designing the 
system’s security was based on public code 
cryptography (elliptic curves, due to code 
size), both for data messages and for network 
administration messages. During the design of 
the system’s security, we kept in mind aspects 
like: the con"dence ratio based on the levels of the 
sta# that plan the operations and the processes of 
Authentication, Authorization, and user access to 
the network, with encrypted mechanisms.
!e messaging system developed is formed by 
di#erent network elements, which are:
t !e tactical units
t !e access nodes
t !e messaging node
t !e security node
t !e Command and Control node (SIC2)
!ese network elements develop speci"c functions 
within the messaging system to permit safe and 
reliable exchange of information, so that said 
information is transmitted exactly to where it is 
required and at the moment requested.
!e Messaging System permits data exchange via 
di#erent transmission media and among equipment 
from di#erent manufacturers, guaranteeing 
interoperability of the system.
Due to security reasons, the System will provide 
access to the messaging services according to 
parameters of authentication, authorization, 
and certi"cation, which must be con"gured and 
negotiated in each case in the security node. 
!e messaging node implements all the necessary 
functionality for message management and 
Design Methodology
Design methodology of a military messaging system 
Ship Science & Technology - Vol. 4 - n.° 8 - (61-73) January 2011 - Cartagena (Colombia)
64
!e "rst step in the process of the design protocol 
is to analyze the operational setting and establish 
the set of communication requirements. !e 
requirements are established in general terms 
including the following:
t Global operational setting (peace/exercise/
war).
t Number of platforms (with prevision for 
additional participants).
t Deployment of the platforms.
t Data to be transmitted and received by 
each platform (or group of platforms if this 
is how matters are facilitated) and their 
characteristics in terms of:
9 Type of platform.
9 Quantity.
9 Security, including requirements 
of privacy, authenticity, integrity, and 
non-repudiation.
9 Type of message.
9 Network administration messages
For proper network operation, it is essential to 
have coordinated use of cryptography; hence, the 
availability of the codes is totally indispensable for 
communications to be possible.
,QIRUPDWLRQH[FKDQJHLQWKHV\VWHP
!e system’s technical functions encompass 
network management and exchange of tactical 
information related to the following 11 tasks of 
operational aspects; these technical functions are:
t Information exchange of the System and of 
permits their exchange between the tactical units 
and the SIC2 node, for which adequate formats 
and technologies have been established to permit 
proper information exchange. 
!e access node is in charge of carrying out gateway 
functions among the di#erent communication 
technologies integrated in Command and Control 
systems. !ere will be as many as it is convenient 
to reach the territorial coverage of the theaters of 
operations.
For the tactical units, two types of applications 
were developed, depending on the means of 
communication: one for radio-communications 
and another for IP communications. !e radio-
communications application accesses the network 
through the access node.
!e following "gure shows a general scheme of the 
messaging system developed.
)LJXUH0HVVDJLQJV\VWHPJHQHUDOVFKHPH
7KHRUHWLFDO)UDPHZRUN
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Network management.
t Precise Identi"cation and Location of 
Participants (PILP).
t Air surveillance.
t Surface surveillance (Maritime).
t Submarine surveillance (Maritime).
t Land surveillance.
t Electromagnetic surveillance.
t Electronic warfare (EW)/ Intelligence.
t Mission management.
t Control.
t Information management.
Types of Messages
!e types of messages derived from the design 
protocol are:
!ese messages contain the following information:
A clearly transmitted heading (without 
cryptography) and encrypted data.
It is important to highlight that the data in each 
type of message were carefully selected to provide 
the basic information according to the type of 
message and additional data that permit feeding 
operational analyses and simulation processes in 
the operations center, which gives added value to 
the system developed.
,GHQWLÀFDWLRQ RI 9RFDEXODU\ )RUPDW RI
Protocol Messages
According to protocol services, all the information 
needs are gathered in the following types of 
messages:
t Link control messages
t Participant identi"cation and location 
messages
t Contact messages
t Tactical unit con"guration messages
t Informal messages (chat) 
Message data may be "Free Text" or "Fixed Format".
Free Text messages are primarily used for chatting, 
although other types of data may also be exchanged 
as long as the participants agree on the format.
Fixed Format messages, as the name indicates, 
have a de"ned format, onto which information 
may only be introduced in the "elds disposed for 
such purpose.
!e message label indicates its function.
!ese 20 types of messages (see Table 2) gather 
the information necessary to obtain the tactical 
panorama in the Command and Control node, 
according to the strategic level this implies.
*XLGHOLQHVIRU0HVVDJH([FKDQJH
To control the exchange of messages, privacy, 
integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation 
services must be implemented, requiring the 
following guidelines:
7DEOH7\SHVRIH[LVWLQJPHVVDJHVLQWKHSURWRFRORIWKH
PHVVDJLQJV\VWHPSURWRW\SH
Type Name of Message
01 Position of Vessels, Submarines, and Boats
02 Position of Airplanes and Helicopters
03 Position of land units
04 Contact report
05 Code request
06 Code delivery
07 Chat
08 Chat reception
09 Connection request
10 Connection data
11 Connection report
12 Table of processes
13 Publication of Tactical unit IP codes
14 Delivery of con"guration
15 Disconnection
16 Veri"cation of tactical unit IP status
17 Response of veri"cation of status
18 Publication of tactical unit Radio codes
19 Veri"cation of tactical unit Radio status
20 Response to initial broadcast
Design methodology of a military messaging system 
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TYPE NAME OF MESSAGE TYPE OF OPERATION
01 Position of Vessels, Submarines, and Boats Participant identi"cation and location messages
02 Position of Airplanes and Helicopters Participant identi"cation and location messages
03 Position of land units Participant identi"cation and location messages
04 Contact report Contact messages
05 Code request Link control messages
06 Code delivery Link control messages
07 Chat Informal messages
08 Chat reception Informal messages
09 Connection request Link control messages
10 Connection data Link control messages
11 Connection report Link control messages
12 Table of processes Link control messages
13 Publication of Tactical unit IP codes Link control messages
14 Delivery of con"guration Tactical unit con"guration messages
15 Disconnection Link control messages
16 Veri"cation of tactical unit IP status Link control messages
17 Response of status veri"cation Link control messages
18 Publication of tactical unit Radio codes Link control messages
19 Veri"cation of tactical unit Radio status Link control messages
20 Response to initial broadcast Link control messages
Table 2. Message labels
a. Privacy is implemented through 
cryptographic procedures of the data 
transmitted; these procedures will be 
performed via code mechanisms through 
elliptic curves.
b. Every station on the network must generate 
its own private code, and through a procedure 
it must generate a public code that stems from 
the product of its own private code and the 
ellipsis point; thereafter, it must publish such 
in the security node delivering it certi"ed.
c. Every station requiring delivery of a 
message must have a public code from the 
addressee, which is sent by the security node 
at the moment of the connection and, with 
a procedure generate the private code of the 
communication that results from its own 
private code, the addressee’s public code, and 
the point of the curve, to proceed to encrypt 
with AES.
d. !e authenticity is made on the security 
node and it is conducted through an encrypted 
message that the security node can decrypt if 
and only if the originator is whom it says it is.
e. Integrity is given if the decrypted message 
has a coherent meaning inasmuch as the 
cryptogram is related to all the contents of the 
message.
f. !e functionality of “non-repudiation” 
is given through the messaging node, which 
registers all the events of all the communications 
of the system.
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g. !e transmitting station must codify the 
data by using the code resulting from the 
point of curve p, and the code from addressee 
Kb; for its part, the addressee does the same 
to determine the code with the same point on 
curve p and the code from originator Ka, then 
encrypts using symmetric AES.
h. !e transmitting unit encrypts the 
message with the code resulting from its own 
code, the addressee’s code, and the ellipsis 
point, and it is directed to the messaging node 
for its distribution.
i. !e messaging node receives the message 
and stores it encrypted and when the addressee 
unit is connected it proceeds to send the 
message, which is already encrypted with the 
addressee code.
j. !e tactical nodes send the encrypted 
messages with the addressee code, through the 
messaging node.
k. At the start of a communication, every 
station must carry out an identi"cation and 
authentication procedure on the security node.
l. !e messaging node must lead to 
registering communication with the following 
data: Type of message, identi"cation of 
originator, identi"cation of addressee, group 
date hour sent, group date hour delivered to the 
addressee, the code gram and the veri"cation 
digit of “pending”.
m. Messages of interactive communications 
(chat) are considered informal, but are also 
controlled by the messaging node.
n. Every tactical unit, when started, sends 
a veri"cation message to the security node 
to corroborate the status of its publication of 
codes.
o. !e security node responds to the 
veri"cation message a$rmatively or negatively, 
depending on whether it has or not published 
the valid code.
p. !e tactical units may request 
disconnection from the network at any time, 
an important situation to keep the system 
from sending messages, but have them stored 
by the messaging node.
q. When a tactical unit is going to 
start operating or has any novelty in its 
con"guration, it must send a con"guration 
message to the Command and Control node. 
!e message includes the relevant aspects of 
the conditions in which the unit operates.
r. !e sta# preparing the order of operations 
must generate and publish the codes of all 
the units participating in such. !is is done 
through the message “publication of codes”, 
which is sent to the security node with the 
code destined for said purpose.
s. Upon a message of publication of codes, 
the security node respond with a message 
“connection data” that contains the table of 
public codes, including the published code, 
and the table of identi"cation of all the units 
reporting.
t. !e tactical units once con"gured and with 
its codes reported, may request connection to 
the network through the message “connection 
request” sent to the security node.
u. !e security node, after authenticating 
it, responds to this last message by sending it 
a message with the updated tables of public 
codes and identi"cation.
v. Likewise, every time a unit requests 
connection, the security node will send 
a message “connection report” to the 
"Command and Control" and "messaging" 
nodes. !is message contains the identi"cation 
of individuals connecting, their IP (in case it is 
(1)
(2)
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a tactical unit via radio, will place the IP of the 
corresponding access node) and the tables of 
public codes and identi"es. 
For the protocol of the messaging system a 
strategic level has been considered so that the types 
of messages that should be transmitted are only 
those referring to the tactical panorama, given 
that this strategic level merely requires supervision 
functions and not direct command, although if 
the command is executed such must be executed 
through the chain of command and not directly.
To design the system’s security, we adopted a 
public code cryptography scheme to ensure 
the data transmitted from and to the systems, 
minimizing exposure of sensitive information and, 
thus, avoiding the possibility of communications 
in transit of being intercepted and decoded.
!e security implemented for the prototype of 
the messaging system developed, although based 
on public code cryptographic security, is able to 
protect the whole system, given that to perform 
any process within the system, it is necessary to 
conduct a series of validations, authentications, 
authorizations.
'HVFULSWLRQRIWKH6HFXULW\6\VWHP
!e security of the messaging system is based on 
that all processes are authenticated, authorized, and 
certi"ed by an ECDH public code cryptographic 
system.
Veri"cation processes made in the security system 
are: 
t In case a user is completely new for the 
system, that user must register (publish 
codes) before accessing the system’s 
functionalities, through a con"dence 
mechanism.
t Access to the Messaging System is restricted 
by the use of codes assigned to users. 
Only units previously authenticated and 
authorized may enter the system.
t Access of these units to work operations on 
the system will be according to the roles, 
permits, and pro"les previously established. 
Authenticated users must be authorized 
according to the pro"les, roles, and permits 
de"ned.
t To access the system, the established digital 
signatures must be used to guarantee the 
integrity of a message and, thus, be able to 
associate it with the author to ensure that 
the contents have not been modi"ed and its 
origin is validated.
In the messaging system developed, the security 
node is in charge of performing all these validations. 
Once the unit is authenticated, it is removed from 
the system and noti"cation is sent to all the active 
elements on the network, reporting the event. All 
the messages (noti"cations) will be encrypted.
(QFU\SWLQJDOJRULWKPXVHG
!e elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) used in 
the messaging system is de"ned as a variant of 
asymmetrical or public code cryptography based 
on the mathematics of elliptic curves. Its authors 
argue that ECC could be quicker and may use 
shorter codes than ancient methods -like RSA - 
while providing an equivalent level of security. !e 
use of elliptic curves in cryptography was proposed 
independently by Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller 
in 1985.
Asymmetrical or public code cryptography systems 
use two distinct codes: one may be public, the 
other is private. Possessing the public code does 
not provide su$cient information to determine 
the private code. !ese types of systems are based 
on the di$culty in "nding the solution to certain 
mathematical problems. One of these problems 
is the so-called discrete logarithm. Finding the 
value of b given equation ab = c, when a and c are 
known values, may be a problem of exponential 
complexity for certain large-size "nite groups; 
while the inverse problem, discrete exponentiation, 
6\VWHP·V6HFXULW\
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can be e$ciently evaluated by using, for example, 
binary exponentiation.
An elliptic curve is a %at curve de"ned by an 
equation in the form of:
With the set of points G that form the curve (i.e., all 
the solutions of the equation plus a point O, called 
point on the in"nite) plus an additive + operation, 
an abelian group is formed. If coordinates x and 
y are chosen from a "nite "eld, then we are in the 
presence of a "nite abelian group. !e problem of 
the discrete logarithm on this set of points (PLDCE) 
is thought to be more di$cult to solve than that 
corresponding to the "nite "elds (PLD). !us, the 
lengths of codes in elliptic curve cryptography can 
be shorter with a comparable level of security.
!e following shows a brief mathematical 
introduction to the algorithm:
Let p > 3 prime. !e elliptic curve
over Zp is the set of solutions (x, y) ࣅ Zp × Zp in the 
congruence
Where a,b ࣅ Zp are constants so that
An additive operation is de"ned as follows: 
Considering that P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2,y2) are 
points on E and O is a point on the in"nite. If x2 = 
x1 and y2 = − y1, then P + Q = O ; on the contrary 
P + Q = (x3, y3), where x3 = ɉ2− x1− x2, y3= ɉ(x1 − 
x3) − y1, and
Finally, we de"ne
With this we may show that E is an abelian group 
with element identity O. It is worth noting that 
the inverse of (x, y) (written as -(x, y) given that 
the operation is additive) is (x, -y), for all (x, y) ࣅE. 
According to the Hasse theorem, the number 
of points #E contained in E is close to p. More 
precisely, the following inequality is satis"ed:
Given that it is known that any prime order 
group is cyclical, what is required is to "nd a 
subgroup of E in the order of q (q prime) to have 
an isomorphism with Zp where the problem of the 
discrete logarithm is untreatable. In this instance, 
being Ƚ a generator of the cyclical group (which 
could be any element of the group di#erent from 
O, the identity), we may calculate the "powers" of 
Ƚ (which are written as multiples of Ƚ because the 
operation of the group is additive).
$OJRULWKPRI&RGH*HQHUDWLRQ
In the cryptographic use, a speci"c base point G is 
selected and published to use with the curve E(q). 
A random integer k is chosen as private code, and 
then the value P = k*G is shown as public code 
(note that the supposed di$culty of the PLDCE 
implies that k is di$cult to deduct from P). If 
the tactical unit A (TUA) and the tactical unit 
B (TUB) have private codes kA and kB, and the 
public codes PA and PB, then TUA could calculate 
kA*PB = (kA*kB)*G; and TUB can obtain the 
same value given that kB*PA = (kB*kA)*G.
!is permits establishing a "secret" value that 
both TUA and TUB can easily calculate, but 
that is very complicated to derive by a third party. 
Additionally, TUB cannot learn anything new on 
kA during this transaction, so that code used by 
TUA continues being private.
(3)
(8)
(9)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
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!e methods used in practice to encrypt messages 
based on this secret value consist in adaptations 
of older cryptosystems from discrete logarithms 
originally designed to be used in other groups. 
Among those we could include Di$e-Hellman, 
ElGamal, and DSA.
Performing the necessary operations to execute 
this system is slower than for a factorization system 
or full-module discrete logarithm of the same size. 
In any case, the authors of ECC systems believe 
that the PLDCE is signi"cantly more complicated 
than the factorization problems or of PLD and, 
thus, the same security may be obtained via shorter 
code lengths by using ECC, to the point that it 
may be faster than, for example, RSA. !e results 
published until now tend to con"rm this, although 
some experts remain skeptical.
Elliptic curve cryptography has been broadly 
recognized as the strongest algorithm for a given 
code length, for which it may be useful on links 
with very limited bandwidth requirements.
NIST and ANSI X9 have established minimum 
requirements of code size of 1024 bits for RSA 
and DSA and 160 bits for ECC, corresponding 
to an 80-bit code symmetrical block. NIST has 
published a list of recommended elliptic curves 
of "ve di#erent code sizes (80, 112, 128, 192, and 
256). In general, the ECC over a binary group 
requires an asymmetrical code double the size of 
that corresponding to a symmetrical code.
$QDO\VLVRI&RQÀGHQFH
Certicom is the main commercial company for 
ECC; this organization has 130 patents and has 
issued licenses on technology to the National 
Security Agency (NSA) for 25 million dollars. 
Certicom has also sponsored several challenges 
to the ECC algorithm. !e most complex solved, 
until now, is a 109-bit code, which was broken 
by a team of researchers in early 2003. !e team 
that broke the code used a parallel massive attack 
based on the 'birthday attack', through more than 
10,000 Pentium-type PCs working continuously 
during 540 days. It is estimated that the minimum 
code length recommended for ECC (163 bits) 
would require 108 times the resources used to solve 
the problem with 109 bits.
!e need to o#er a reliable and e$cient 
communications system is ever-more important 
in military operations, given that the di#erent 
systems supporting a mission depend greatly on 
a communications infrastructure with enough 
capacity for transport of information that 
guarantees the availability of such at the indicated 
time and place. 
!e messaging system developed contemplates data 
exchange by networks with di#erent transmission 
media, from high and low bandwidth, considering 
security mechanisms like information encryption, 
for information transference through an 
asynchronous communications mechanism where 
data transmission takes place in deferred time and 
in real time.
!e data communications system is supported by 
the current network infrastructure, which de"nes 
characteristics for information transference and 
integration of services, aspects that should be kept 
in mind to obtain the maximum advantage from 
the resources o#ered by said network. Likewise, 
the system is supported on the RF communication 
systems (tactical radios), which should guarantee 
the necessary measures to maintain the operational 
channel.
'HVFULSWLRQ RI WKH &RPPXQLFDWLRQV
1HWZRUN
!e networks available for the development of the 
messaging system were:
t IP network with repeaters located in high 
places, with incomplete coverage of the 
possible theaters of operations.
t VSAT network with "xed and mobile land 
stations to cover theaters of operations 
outside the prior coverage.
t Low orbit satellite telephone network 
to complement the coverage previously 
exposed.
&RPPXQLFDWLRQV1HWZRUN
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!ese networks imply an availability of 
restricted bandwidth, which was proven through 
experimentation. For VHF and UHF with a 25-
KHz theoretical bandwidth, we accomplished a 
velocity of 2.4 kbps in the tests and bearing in mind 
these results, we measure performances.  With low 
orbit satellite telephone service we experimented 
with IRIDIUM in two services: short bus data and 
data kit, obtaining the following performance: a 
velocity of 9.6 kbps with some restrictions:
1. Necessity for clear skies and without 
obstacles.
2. We noted low availability, especially in 
jungle zones.
It is worth noting how limited the bandwidth is 
for any of the means used by the tactical units to 
transmit information; thereby, becoming a limiting 
factor of the design.
To view the coherence among the most important 
components of the messaging system developed, 
the following "gure shows the interrelation among 
them and their spiral development, to accomplish 
optimization of the system.
&RKHUHQFHDPRQJGHVLJQV
SECURITY DESIGN
PROTOCOL DESIGN
CONTROL AND COMMAND
APLICATIONS
NETWORK RESTRICTIONS
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
)LJXUH6SLUDOGHVLJQGLDJUDP
)LJXUH7DFWLFDOSDQRUDPD
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Figure 2 shows how the designs of the system’s 
components create relationships of interdependence 
and as they advance on the spiral, the system’s 
performance improves, adjusted to the restrictions 
established.
Figure 3 shows a tactical panorama for a situation 
of intervention among a vessel, a submarine, an 
airplane, a helicopter (identi"ed in blue) and an 
army company (identi"ed in white) from the same 
forces.
!e operation is of maritime interdiction in which 
the units have made their reports of position and 
con"guration to the Command and Control node. 
Additionally, they have made contact reports, thus:
t An Electronic Support Measure (ESM) 
detection report from the submarine (this 
detection appears in red dotted line in 
Figure 3).
t An ESM detection report from the surface 
unit, correlated with the prior report.
!e surface unit launched the helicopter to 
intercept the contact identi"ed in the Command 
and Control center, from the ESM correlation.
!e prediction of the reach of the helicopter 
radar may be noted in Figure 3, as made at the 
Command and Control center, with a 50% 
probability of detection, taking as a base the data 
from the con"guration report, which includes 
the characteristics of its search radar and the 
characteristics of the target sought.
Another important factor is that position 
simulations are made (in function of time) in the 
Command and Control center, both of its units 
and of the contacts, guaranteeing a very good 
approximation to what will happen in real time.
Herein, we introduced the design of a messaging 
system, characterized by the coherence among 
its components, designed to obtain the tactical 
panorama in a strategic center. 
!rough this development, we showed that it is 
possible to have a military messaging system by 
using a low bandwidth communications network.
We obtained a security level that satis"ed 
the system’s requirements, using public code 
cryptography, with a code space of 2192, which 
guarantees privacy between "secret" and "ultra 
secret" levels (according to NSA). 
!e messaging system developed guarantees 
privacy, integrity, certi"cation, authenticity, and 
non-repudiation of the information transmitted 
and of the factors intervening in Exchange 
processes of such.
Finally, it must be highlighted that the messaging 
system contemplates mechanisms to support the 
asynchrony of the military reports made.
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